Sec 529

As we have already seen, subscribers to business corporations will be relieved from liability on subscriptions obtained from them by fraud.4 The same principle applies to subscriptions to charitable and religious enterprises.8 Should it appear, for instance, that, when the subscription is conditioned on raising a specific sum, some of the subscriptions were to be regarded as merely honorary, or were fictitious, this relieves the parties making the other subscriptions.6 Nor can the subscription be enforced if the object be materially changed.7

Sec 530

Provided there be nothing in the agreement which is against the policy of the law, an interchange of patronage is a valid consideration. Thus where A., a subscriber to a charity, agreed with B., another subscriber, that A. would vote at one meeting for a particular candidate for relief, if B. would at a subsequent meeting vote for another candidate, this agreement was held valid.1 But such an agreement by electors to a public office would be void as against the policy of the law.2

Fraud vitiates subscription.

Interchange of patronage sufficient.

1 Knoxboro Church v. Beech, 74 N. Y. 72.

2 See supra, sec 10.

3 Pratt v. Trustees, 93 111. 475; aff. in Beach v. Church, 96 111. 179. 4 Supra, sec 276.

5 Middlebury College v. Loomis, 1 Vt. 189.

6 Middlebury College v. Loomis, 1 Vt. 189; New York Exchange Co. v. Be Wolf, 31 N. Y. 273.

7 Worcester Med. Inst. v. Bigelow, 6 Gray, 498.

Sec 531

It is not necessary in order to make the transfer of a right a valid consideration, that it should be a legal right. It is sufficient if it be an equitable right.3 Hence a release by a mortgagor of an equity of redemption is a valid consideration;4 and so, in England, forbearance by the assignee of a debt, whose title is there merely equitable.5

Sec 532

Forbearing to press either a legal or equitable claim is a sufficient consideration for a promise.6 Guarantees of debts are constantly rested on considerations of this kind; and when no time of forbearance is specified, the contract will be construed to mean a forbearance for a reasonable time.7 And forbearance to sell goods under a bill of sale, or to execute a writ of fi.fa. has been held a sufficient consideration for a promise by a third party to pay the debt;8and so of forbearance to press an action for a tort, though it may be that the plaintiff in such action sustained no actual loss;9 and so of forbearance in issuing execution;10 and of withdrawing objections to the probate of a will,1 and of adjourning a suit in a justice's court.2 The accepting by a creditor of a promissory note for an existing debt is evidence of a forbearance to sue until the maturity of the note; and this forbearance is a sufficient consideration for the note.3 Nor does the fact that the party promising to pay is an executor, and that the consideration is the debt of his testator, relieve the executor from personal liability when he personally promises to pay in consideration of forbearance to the estate.4 An agreement, also, by a petitioner to withdraw his application for winding up a company, is a sufficient consideration for a promise to pay the debt of the party so withdrawing, although there is nothing in the agreement to preclude him from presenting another petition to the same effect.5 And an agreement by a tax collector to forbear distraining will be a consideration for a promise by the owner to pay the tax.6 - Agreements to forbear criminal prosecutions, as we have seen, when amounting to compounding indictable offences, are, on independent grounds, illegal.7 But there is no reason why such agreements to forbear should not be valid, and hence should form a sufficient consideration for a promise, in cases where the prosecution is only quasi criminal, and is virtually for the collection of a debt.8 Hence forbearance in an affiliation procedure is a valid consideration for a promise by the alleged father to support the child.9 - A forbearance, however, to be a consideration must be for a reasonable time; as otherwise, if the forbearance be not appreciable, there is no consideration.10 - But an agreement to forbear Merely equitable rights valid consideration.

Forbearance of legal proceedings is a sufficient consideration.

1 Bolton v. Madden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 55.

2 Supra, sec 407 et seq.

3 Leake, 2d ed. 624; Wells v. Wells, 1 Vent. 40; Gully v. Bishop of Exeter, 10 B. & C. 606: Carpenter v. Dodge, 20 Vt. 595; Pearson v. Pearson, 7 Johns. 26; Whitbeck v. Whitbeck, 9 Cow. 266; Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh, 337.

4 Thorpe v. Thorpe, 1 L. Raym. 663.

5 Morton v. Burn, 7 A. & E. 19. See infra, sec 532. '.

6 Leake, 2d ed. 622; Thornton v. Fairlie, 2 Moore, 397; Willatts v. Kennedy, 8 Bing. 5; Union Bk. v. Geary, 5 Pet. 99; Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. 148; King v. Upton, 4 Me. 387; Chapin v. Lapham, 20 Pick. 467; Barlow v. Ins. Co., 4 Met. 270; Abbott v. Fisher, 124 Mass. 414; Stewart v. McGuin, 1 Cow. 99; Ward v. Fryer, 19 Wend. 494; Russell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 504;.

Perkins v. Gray, 3 S. & R. 327; Giles v. Ackles, 9 Barr, 147; Cook v. Duvall, 9 Gill, 460; Durham v. Wadlington, 2 Strob. Eq. 258; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Olcott, 97 111. 439; see Mechanics' Bk. v. Wixson, 42 N. Y. 438.

7 Oldershaw v. King, 2 H. & N. 517; Coles v. Pack, L, R. 5 C. P. 65; Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 55; Sage v. Wilcox, 6 Conn. 81; Watson v. Randall, 20 Wend. 201; Hamaker v. Eb-erley, 2 Binn. 506; Muirhead v. Kirk-patrick, 21 Penn. St. 237; Colgin v. Henley, 6 Leigh, 85; see Cary v. White, 52 N. Y. 138.

8 Barrell v. Trussell, 4 Taunt. 117; Pullin v. Stokes, 2 H. Bl. 312; see Hockenbury v. Meyers, 5 Vroom, 346.

9 Davis v. Morgan, 4 B. & C. 8.

10 Lent v. Padelford, 10 Mass. 230.

1 Hill v. Buckminster, 5 Pick. 393.

2 Stewart v. McGuin, 1 Cow. 99; Richardson v. Brown, 1 Cow. 255.

3 Baker v. Walker, 14 M. & W. 465; Jennison v. Stafford, 1 Cush. 168; see Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320; Martin v. Black, 20 Ala. 309. As to the conflict of opinion whether receiving negotiable paper is a satisfaction, see sec 953 et seq.

4 Leake, 2d ed. 623; citing Fisher v. Richardson, Cro. Jac. 47; Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 350 n.

5 Harris v. Venables, L. R. 7 Ex. 235. 6 Burrs v. Wilcox, 13 Allen. 269; see Baileyville v. Lowell, 20 Me. 178. 7 See supra, sec 483.

8 Supra, sec 486.

9 Linnegar v. Hodd, 5 C. B. 437; Follit v. Koetzow, 2 E. & E. 730; see supra, sec 525, for other cases.

10 Mecorney v. Stanley, 8 Cush. 85; Boyd v. Freize, 5 Gray, 553; Shupe v. Galbreath, 32 Penn. St. 10; and cases cited Wald's Pollock, 166; see as sustaining the position that a vague stateimmediate pressure will, under the circumstances of the case be construed to mean forbearance for a reasonable time;1 and so when the length of time is left open.2 And there must be some definite party to have been sued.3 When the promise is to forbear to sue generally, this will be construed, if the context require no other inference, to mean a promise to forbear permanently.4 - Mere forbearance, however, without an agreement, being an executed act, is not a sufficient consideration.5 - The fact that the suit is not well founded makes no difference, if it has a show of title;6 though it is otherwise in cases of fraud,7 and in cases where the claim to be forborne is utterly destitute of support.8 ment of indulgence is a consideration, Alliance Bk. v. Broom, 2 Dr. & Sm. 289; contra, see Nelson v. Serle, 4 M. & W. 795; Bixler v. Ream, 3 Barr, 282. 1 Pollock, 166; Oldershaw v. King,.

2 H. & N. 517; Hakes v. Hotclikiss, 23 Vt. 235; Lonsdale v. Brown, 4 Wash. C. C. 148; see Hamaker v. Eberley, 2 Binn. 506; Clark v. Russell,.

3 Watts, 213. That the time must be definite see, further, Crofts v. Beale, 11 C. B. 172.

2 Kiting v. Vanderlyn, 4 Johns. 237; Hamaker v. Eberley, 2 Binn. 506; Clark v. Russell, 3 Watts, 213;.

3 Nelson v. Serle, 4 M. & W. 795; see Jones v. Ashburnham, 4 East, 455.

4 Herring v. Dorell, 8 Dow. P. C. 604; Elting v. Vanderlyn, 4 Johns. 437; Clark v. Russell, 3 Watts, 213. As to covenant not to sue, see infra, sec 1036.

5 Manter v. Churchill, 127 Mass. 31; supra, sec 514.

6 Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449; infra, sec 533.

7 Supra, sec 232.

8 Smith v. Algar, 1 B. & Ad. 604; Nelson v. Serle, 4 M. & W. 795; Kidder v. Blake, 45 N. H. 530; Pitkin v. Noyes, 48 N. H. 304; Freeman v. Boynton, 7 Mass. 483; Martin v. Black, 20 Ala. 309. The ruling in Callisher v. Bischoffsheim, supra, is stated by Mr. Langdell to be that forbearance " is a sufficient consideration if the promisee 'bona fide believed he had a fair chance of success,' so that he might have sued without bad faith; and that, as there is a legal presumption in favor of honesty and good faith, the plaintiff need only allege in his declaration that he made the claim and threatened to sue, and that the defendant, if he wished to show that the forbearance constituted no consideration, must plead and prove that the plaintiff knew that he had no cause of action;" and this Mr. Langdell holds to be "alike repugnant to authority and principle," and he maintains it is inconsistent with Cook v. Wright, 1 B. & S.559, on which it is professedly based. Lang. Cont. ii. 1018. It may be that Callisher v. BischoflFsheim went too far in throwing on the defendant the burden of proving that the plaintiff knew that he had no cause of action. But it does not go too far in holding that probable cause is sufficient to support a compromise. There is no litigated suit in which success is absolutely certain; and if there is a show of a case bona fide brought, its abandonment is a good consideration for a promise. Of course, these remarks do not apply.