In those states, also, in which it is held that a third party cannot sue B. and C. on a contract made between them for the subscription, and thus mutual and independent promises are made, which constitute a legal and sufficient consideration for each other. They are thus held to rest upon a well settled principle in respect to concurrent promises."

In Carr v. Bartlett, 72 Me. 121, it was said by Peters, J.: "The defendant, with others, signed an agreement of association containing the following clauses: ' We, the undersigned, residents of the town of Mont-ville and vicinity, hereby agree to enter into association for the purpose of erecting and operating a cheese factory, . . . and we severally and individually bind ourselves, by these presents, on or before the first day of May, 1874, to pay our regularly appointed building committee the several sums set opposite our names for the purpose of building and furnishing said factory. . . . The above not to be binding unless the sum of $2000 is subscribed.' This undertaking, while it remained inchoate and incomplete, was not binding upon the defendant. It was without consideration. It was not a sufficient consideration that others joined in the same promise, relying upon her promise. Foxcroft Academy v. Favor, 4 Me. 382; Cottage St. M. E. Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528. The latter case is the subject of an instructive note, citing and discussing a mass of authorities, in Am. Law Reg. Sept. No. 1877. At this stage of the undertaking the defendant could have withdrawn from it, or she could continue a party until the same became a completed agreement and binding upon her. She took the latter course. The subscription became completed. Her associates paid in their subscriptions, made purchases, and entered into contracts necessary for the consummation of the common enterprise. She is presumed to have assented to all that was done. Those facts furnished a sufficient consideration for the liability which by her subscription she assumed. The authorities are agreed upon this point, as the cases cited and those to be cited clearly show.

"It is denied that the plaintiffs are competent parties to sue for the subscription. They are the regularly appointed building committee of the subscribers. They are themselves subscribers. In their name, for the benefit of the associates, they contracted for the erection of the factory. Under the agreement they are the payees or promisees by description, in whose names the subscriptions are collectible for the benefit of all concerned. They are the association by representation. Therefore, the objection is avoided that sometimes is presented in this class of contracts, that the mutual promises of the subscribers do not afford a consideration for a contract with a third person, for a want of privity between the subscribers and such person. Thompson v. Page, 1 Met. 565; Ives v. Sterling, 6 ib. 310; Fisher v. Ellis, 3 Pick. 323; Watkins v. Eames, 9 Cush. 537; Athol Music Hall v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471; Curry v. Rogers, 21 N. H. 247. There can be no valid objection to a suit in the name of the plaintiffs for the benefit of themselves and associates. See infra, sec 808.

"It is further objected that the property and business became absorbed into a corporation subsequently formed. But this was after the defendant's liahis benefit, the mere fact of the contract being binding between B. and C. (subscribers to the charitable corporation), does not enable the corporation subscribed to, to sue.1 And a mere agreement by A., B.,C, and D. to subscribe a sum opposite to their names to some public object, there being no promisee named in the paper, and no privity of contract between the subscribing parties, does not sustain a suit brought against any one of them on his subscription. It would be otherwise, as we have seen, if a promisee be named who is to make and does make certain efforts in consideration of the subscription. As between the subscribers, also, there would be mutual liability if they agree together to make up a specific sum, so that the withdrawal of one increased the amount to be paid by the others. But if neither of these conditions exists, and if there is no privity of contract between the parties subscribing, the subscriptions must be regarded as inchoate or tentative.2 Nor can a subscription to an incorporated church be enforced by the corporation unless it appear that the subscription was for its specific uses, though the treasurer to whom the subscription is made may sue if it was made perbility became fixed. It seems that all the subscribers were incorporated into a company with a corporate name, without any change in the purposes of the association or adding any liabilities to those before assumed. It gave them little more than ' a local habitation and a name.' Whether the defendant became thereby legally a member of the incorporated body or not, it is not a reason why her subscription cannot be enforced by the committee to whom the payment by the agreement was to be made. No right can be taken from her. For any loss or injury caused by others she can commence an action or resort to a remedy in equity. Thompson v. Page, supra; Fishery. Ellis, supra; Mirick v. French, 2 Gray, 420; Machias Hotel Co. v. Coyle, 35 Me. 405.

"The corporation voted to release the defendant from the payment of the subscription. The vote was without any consideration, and before the vote was acted upon, it was reconsidered and annulled. That affords no defence to the action."

1 Cottage St. Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528; see infra, sec 784 etseq.; supra, sec 506-7. That something to be done by the institution subscribed to is a consideration for the subscription, see Simpson College v. Bryan, 50 Iowa, 293; supra, sec 505.

2 See George v. Harris, 4 N. H. 533; Curry v. Rogers, 1 Fost. 255; Farrn-ington Acad. v. Allen, 14 Mass. 172; Rensselaer Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. 603; Methodist Asso. v. Sharp, 6 Mo. Ap. 150.