The universal rule of contracts, causa proxima non remota spectatur, applies also to insurance against fire. But both usage and law give a very liberal construction in favor of the assured under fire policies. Thus, one of the most common grounds for a claim upon insurers against fires, is for injury caused by the water used to extinguish the fire. This would probably be confined, nearly if not altogether, to goods within the building which was on fire. We doubt, however, if there is any other exception. Thus, if a large building, of many stories, were filled throughout with goods, and the building or the goods were under such insurance, and a fire took place in any part of the building, all the goods within that building which were injured by the water used by the firemen, must be paid for. * We have never known an instance in which the question has been raised in regard to the necessity or expediency of using so much water, or as to the unskilfulness of the firemen. Nor should we indeed confine this from the resulting fire, but not from the explosion, Briggs v. N. A. Ins. Co. 53 N. Y. 446; and where an insurance company was not to be liable for collision unless fire ensued, nor for fire from petroleum, it was held not liable for fire from petroleum after a collision. Insurance Co. v. Express Co. 95 U. S. 227.

(nn) Everett v. London Assurance Co. 19 C. B. (n. S.) 126. (no) 7 Wallace, 44.

(o) Millaudon v. N. O. Ins. Co. 4 La. An. 15.

absolutely to goods within the building. If a building not insured were on fire, and a contiguous or a very near building were in real danger, and, to avert this, efforts were made to wet the outside of the endangered building, and goods insured within this building are hurt by this water, we believe the injury would be regarded as a loss within the policy. (p) So it might be, if damage was done to goods in a building not on fire by leakage from the hose carried through the building to extinguish a fire in an adjoining building. If, however, there were no fire anywhere, and water were thrown, in the erroneous belief that there was a fire, a different question would arise; and we should say that the insurers would not be liable.

Policies of insurance on goods against fire, sometimes require that the insured shall employ all possible diligence to save or remove their goods; but such a provision would be only a confirmation of the obligation which the law and public policy impose upon the insured. Hence, injury to or loss of goods which was caused by their removal from the danger of fire, is a common ground for a claim under a fire policy. (pp) But there must be a reasonable application of this rule; the goods must be removed from immediate danger, and not because of some fear of a possible or remote danger. And if the loss or injury could be attributed to the want of even so much care as could be given under such circumstances, the negligence, and not the fire, would be regarded as the proximate cause, and the insurers would not be liable. (q) Insurers are liable for the loss caused by the blowing up of buildings to arrest the progress of a fire, * when that pre caution was justified by the circumstances. (r) 1 And this

(p) Case v. Hartford Ins. Co. 13 Ill. 680; Hillier v. Alleghany Co. Ins. Co. 3 Barr, 470; Agnew v. Ins. Co. 7 Am. Law Reg. 168; Babcock v. Montgomery Co. Ins. Co. 6 Barb. 637 ; Scripture v. Lowell Ins. Co. 10 Cush. 356, per Cushing, J.; Lewis v. Springfield Ins. Co. 10 Gray, 159; Whitehurst v. Fayetteville Ins. Co. 6 Jones, 352.

(pp) Insurers were held for a loss by larceny, in Witherell v. Maine Ins. Co. 49 Me. 200. See also, where the insurers were held for a loss on goods removed from imminent peril, although the store from which they were removed was never reached by the fire. White v. Republic Ins. Co. 57 Me. 91.

(q) See Case v. Hartford Ins. Co. 13 Ill. 676; Babcock v. Montgomery Co. Ins. Co. 6 Barb. 640; Hillier v. Alleghany Co. Ins'. Co. 3 Barr, 470; Agnew v. Ins. Co. 7 Am. Law Reg. 168, affirmed Independent Ins. Co. v. Agnew, 34 Penn. State, 96; Tilton v. Hamilton Ins. Co. 1 Bosw. 367; Webb v. Protection Ins. Co. 14 Misso. 3.

(r) City Fire Ins. Co. v. Corlies, 21 Wend. 367; Pentz v. Receivers of AEtna Fire Ins. Co. 3 Edw. Ch. 341, 9 Paige, 568; Gordon v. Rimmington, 1 Camp. 123.

1 In Boon v. AEtna Ins. Co. 40 Conn. 575, insurers were held liable for a loss caused by the firing of buildings by the commander of United States troops to prevent stores from falling into the hands of the Confederate troops, who were in superior force, which was held, where a house on fire was blown up by gunpowder, and the policy provided that the insurers should not be liable for a loss from the explosion of gunpowder; because this provision was held to exclude only fire originating from an explosion of gunpowder. (s) But in another case, where the policy excluded any loss occasioned by the explosion of a steam-boiler, and by reason of such explosion the building was set on fire, the insurers were held not liable, although the fire was the proximate cause of the loss; because the loss was directly and wholly occasioned by the explosion. (t)

We are not aware that general average claims or provisions are ever inserted in American fire policies, although they are said to be in English policies; but the principle of general average may have some application in this country. In one case where insurance was effected on a stock of goods in a certain store, and, an adjoining store being on fire, the insured, with the consent of the president of the insurance company, bought some blankets and spread them on the outside of the store where it was exposed to the flames, the building was saved, but the blankets were ruined. The assured claimed to recover the entire expense. The company contended, that if liable at all, it was only for the proportion which they had at risk upon the policy, taken in connection with the store, of which the plaintiffs had a lease for ten years, and the value of the stock over and above the sum insured upon it; and the court held that they were only liable for this amount. (u)

It is common for policies against fire to provide that the insurers may elect either to pay for damages in money or to repair or rebuild. And it has been held that if insurers under this provision elect to rebuild, this converts the contract of insurance into a building contract; and if then they do not rebuild, the damages for their failure are not limited by the amount insured, but must be the sum required to erect a building of equal value with that insured. (uu)

(s) Greenwald v. Ins. Co. 7 Am. Law Reg 282. The clause was construed to mean "fire originating from an explosion of gunpowder."

(t) St. John v. American Ins. Co. 1 Duer, 371, 1 Kern. 516

(u) Welles v. Boston Ins. Co. 6 Pick.

182. It was also contended, that the property in the neighborhood ought also to contribute; but the court held, that the contribution must be limited to the building and the property therein immediately saved.

(uu) Morrell v. Irving Ins. Co. 33 N.

act was justified by the emergency, although the policy contained a proviso against liability for loss from "any invasion, insurrection, riot, or civil commotion, or of any military or usurped power."