There is this difference between marine policies and fire policies. The perils against which marine policies insure are generally, * although not always, such as could not be averted by any care or skill which could reasonably be demanded; whereas, the great majority of fires are caused by the negligence of somebody, and very commonly by the negligence of some of the family or servants of the insured. It is to guard against this very risk, that fire policies are made; and it has been held, that insurers are liable for a fire caused not only by persons employed by the insured, but by his own negligence. (v) 1 In either case the fire would be regarded as the proximate cause of the loss, and the negligence as the remote cause. It may be said, therefore, that the negligence of the insured, which is but an imperfect ground of defence, even in marine policies, is almost none in fire policies. In a case in Massachusetts, the insurers admitted the loss, and that a fraudulent design to set fire to the building was not imputed to the plaintiff, and offered to show that the building insured was destroyed through the gross negligence and carelessness of the plaintiff, and through his gross misconduct. The court below ruled, that evidence to prove such facts was not material; but the Supreme Court, declaring that they could not say that negligence could not be such as to discharge the insurers, ordered a new trial. But the court, in their decision, so described the negligence which alone would have this effect, that there was no new trial; the insurers paying the loss, with some abatement. (w)

T. 429; Beals v. Home Ins. Co. 36 N. Y. 522.

(v) In Shaw v. Robberds, 6 A. & E. 76, 83, Lord Denman, C. J., said: "One argument more remains to be noticed, viz., that the loss here arose from the plaintiff's own negligent act in allowing the kiln to be used for a purpose to which it was not adapted. There is no doubt that one of the objects of insurance against fire, is to guard against the negligence of servants and others; and, therefore, the simple fact of negligence has never been held to constitute a defence. But it is argued that there is a distinction between the negligence of servants and strangers, and that of the assured himself. We do not see any ground for such a distinction, and are of opinion that, in the absence of all fraud, the proximate cause of the loss only is to be looked to." This doctrine is now well-settled law in this country. Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 3 Pet. 222; Columbia Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 10 Pet 617, 618; Waters v. Merchants Ins. Co. 11 id. 213, 226; Perrin v. Protection Ins. Co. 11 Ohio, 147, overruling Lodwicks v. Ohio Ins. Co. 6 id. 433; St. Louis Ins. Co. v. Glasgow, 8 Misso. 718; Mathews v. Howard Ins. Co. 13 Barb. 234, overruling Grim v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 13 Johns. 451; Hynds v. Schenectady Co. Ins. Co. 16 Barb. 119; St. John v. American Ins. Co. 1 Duer, 371; Gates v. Madison Co. Ins. Co. 1 Seld. 469; Copeland v. New England Ins. Co. 2 Met 432; Butman v. Monmouth Ins. Co. 36 Maine, 227; Catlin v. Springfield Ins. Co. 1 Sumner, 434; Henderson v. Western Ins. Co. 10 Hob. La. 164; National Ins. Co. v. Webster, &3 Ill 470; Germania Ins. Co. v. Sherlock, 26 Ohio St. 33; Jameson v. Royal Ins. Co. Ir. R. 7 C. L. 126.

1 Enterprise Ins. Co. v. Parisot, 35 Ohio St 35; Mickey v. Burlington Ins. Co. 35 Ia. 174.